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Abstract
Symbolic secrecy of exchanged keys is arguably one of the most important notions of secrecy shown
with automated proof tools. It means that an adversary restricted to symbolic operations on terms can
never get the entire key into its knowledge set. Cryptographic key secrecy essentially means computa-
tional indistinguishability between the real key and a random one, given the view of a much more general
adversary.
We provide the first proof of cryptographic key secrecy for the strengthened Yahalom protocol, which
constitutes one of the most prominent key exchange protocols analyzed by means of automated proof
tools. The proof holds in the presence of arbitrary active attacks provided that the protocol is imple-
mented using standard provably secure cryptographic primitives. We exploit recent results on linking
symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy in order to perform a symbolic proof of secrecy for the Ya-
halom protocol in a specific setting that allows us to derive the desired cryptographic key secrecy from
the symbolic proof.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols for key establishment are an established technology. Nevertheless, most new net-
working and messaging stacks come with new protocols for such tasks. Since designing cryptographic
protocols is known to be error-prone and, owing to the distributed-system aspects of multiple interleaved
protocol runs, security proofs of such protocols are awkward to make for humans, automation of such proofs
has been studied almost since cryptographic protocols first emerged. From the start, the actual cryptographic
operations in such proofs were idealized into so-called Dolev-Yao models, following [35] with extensions
in [36, 48], e.g., see [50, 47, 41, 57, 58, 1, 46, 53]. These models replace cryptography by term algebras,
e.g., encrypting a message m twice does not yield a different message from the basic message space but the
term E(E(m)). A typical cancellation rule is D(E(m)) = m for all m. It is assumed that even an adver-
sary can only operate on terms by the given operators and by exploiting the given cancellation rules. This
assumption, in other words the use of initial models of the given equational specifications, makes it highly
nontrivial to know whether results obtained over a Dolev-Yao model are also valid over real cryptography.
One therefore calls properties and actions in Dolev-Yao models symbolic in contrast to cryptographic.
Arguably the most important and most common properties proved symbolically are secrecy properties,
as initiated in [35], and in particular key secrecy properties. Symbolically, the secrecy of a key is represented
by knowledge sets: The key is secret if the adversary can never get the corresponding symbolic term into
∗An earlier version of this work appeared in [21].
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its knowledge set. Cryptographically, key secrecy is defined by computational indistinguishability between
the real key and a randomly chosen one, given the view of the adversary. Hence symbolic secrecy captures
the absence of structural attacks that make the secret as a whole known to the adversary, and because of its
simplicity it is accessible to formal proofs tools, while cryptographic secrecy constitutes a more fine-grained
notion of secrecy that is much harder to establish.
The Yahalom protocol [33, 54] is one of the most prominent key exchange protocols. Paulson discov-
ered that the original protocol from [33] is insecure and proposed a strengthened variant [54]. This was
extensively investigated, e.g., in [54, 37, 32, 29]. However, all existing security proofs are restricted to the
Dolev-Yao model. We provide the first security proof of the strengthened Yahalom protocol in the more
comprehensive cryptographic sense, i.e., we show that keys exchanged between two honest users are secret
in the strong sense of indistinguishability from random keys. This holds in the presence of arbitrary active
attacks, provided that the Dolev-Yao abstraction of symmetric encryption is implemented by a symmetric
encryption scheme that is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and additionally ensures integrity of ci-
phertexts. This is the standard security definition of authenticated symmetric encryption [31, 30]. Efficient
symmetric encryptions schemes provably secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [30, 56].
We achieve this result by exploiting recent work on linking Dolev-Yao models to the standard model of
cryptography. We analyze the Yahalom protocol based on the cryptographic library of Backes, Pfitzmann,
and Waidner [24, 27, 18], which corresponds to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model that can be faithfully
realized using provably secure cryptographic primitives. In combination with a recent result on linking
symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy [20], this allows us to perform a symbolic proof of secrecy for the
Yahalom protocol and to derive the desired cryptographic key secrecy from that. This is the first symbolic
proof of a cryptographic protocol that can be exploited to derive cryptographic secrecy for the exchanged
keys. (Another such proof was conducted concurrently and independently by Canetti and Herzog, cf. below.)
Further Related Work. Cryptographic underpinnings of a Dolev-Yao model were first addressed by
Abadi and Rogaway [3]. They only handled passive adversaries and symmetric encryption. The proto-
col language and security properties were extended in [2, 42, 38], but still only for passive adversaries. This
excludes most of the typical ways of attacking protocols. A full cryptographic justification for a Dolev-Yao
model, i.e., for arbitrary active attacks and within arbitrary surrounding interactive protocols, was first given
in [24] with extensions in [27, 18]. Based on that Dolev-Yao model, the well-known Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe and Otway-Rees protocols as well as a variant of the 3KP payment system were proved in [17, 5, 7].
The first and the third result are entirely authentication proofs and hence does not have to reason about
secrecy aspects. The second one contains a key secrecy property but this was reformulated by hand into
a (considerably weaker) integrity property so that the integrity preservation theorem could be used. More-
over, after the initial publication of the current work, a computationally sound security proof of basic and
public-key Kerberos [6] and of a widely deployed Web Services protocol [14] was achieved in a similar
manner. In general, our result can moreover be seen as a demonstration of the usefulness of the crypto-
graphic library [24], their extensions [18, 27], and the corresponding general theorems for linking symbolic
and cryptographic properties based on this library [11, 23, 15, 16, 20, 4] for establishing secrecy properties
in a cryptographically sound manner. Moreover, automated proof support for the cryptographic library was
recently achieved in [59].
Laud [43] has recently presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric
encryption under active attacks. His work enjoys a direct connection with a formal proof tool, but it is
specific to certain confidentiality properties, restricts the surrounding protocols to straight-line programs
in a specific language, and does not address a connection to the remaining primitives of the Dolev-Yao
model. Herzog et al. [39] and Micciancio and Warinschi [49] have recently also given a cryptographic
underpinning under active attacks. Their results are narrower than that in [24] since they are specific for
2
public-key encryption, but consider slightly simpler real implementations; moreover, the former relies on
a stronger assumption whereas the latter severely restricts the classes of protocols and protocol properties
that can be analyzed using this primitive. Section 6 of [49] further points out several possible extensions of
their work which all already exist in the earlier work of [24]. Since computational soundness has become a
highly active line of research, we exemplarily list further recent results in this area without going into further
details [12, 25, 26, 22, 10, 19, 8, 28, 13, 9].
Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-
time considerations, in particular [51, 44, 52, 40] and, as a second step, to encode them into proof tools. This
approach can not yet handle protocols with any degree of automation. It is complementary to the approach
of proving simple deterministic abstractions of cryptography and working with those wherever cryptography
is only used in a blackbox way.
Concurrently and independently to our work, Canetti and Herzog [34] have linked ideal functionalities
for mutual authentication and key exchange protocols to corresponding representations in a formal language.
They apply their techniques to the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol by considering the exchanged nonces
as secret keys. Their work is restricted to the mentioned functionalities and in contrast to the universally
composable library [24] hence does not address soundness of Dolev-Yao models in their usual generality.
The considered language does not allow loops and offers public-key encryption as the only cryptographic
operation (symmetric encryption is not considered although the language is used to reason about symmetric
keys). Moreover, their approach to define a mapping between ideal and real traces following the ideas
of [49] only captures trace-based properties (i.e., integrity properties); reasoning about secrecy properties
additionally requires ad-hoc and functionality-specific arguments.
2 The Strengthened Yahalom Protocol
The Yahalom protocol [33] and its strengthened variant [54] are four-step protocols for establishing a shared
secret encryption key between two users. The protocol relies on a distinguished trusted party T, and it is
assumed that every user u initially shares a secret key Kut with T. Expressed in the typical protocol notation
as in, e.g., [45], the strengthened Yahalom works as follows.1
1. u→ v : u,Nu
2. v → T : v,Nv , (u,Nu)Kvt
3. T→ u : Nv, (v,Kuv , Nu)Kut , (u, v,Kuv , Nv)Kvt
4. u→ v : (u, v,Kuv , Nv)Kvt .
User u seeks to share a new session key with user v. It generates a nonce Nu and sends it to v together with
its identity (first message). Next, v generates a new nonce Nv, creates a new message containing the identity
u and the nonce Nu, and encrypts it with the key it shares with T. Then v sends its identity, its nonce Nv, and
the encryption to the trusted party (second message). Now T decrypts the encryption yielding the identity of
u and the nonce Nu, generates a fresh key Kuv for u and v, generates a message according to the protocol
description, and sends it to u (third message). Then u decrypts the first encryption and tests whether the
contained nonce is the one it sent to v before, i.e., to the identity that is contained in this encryption. If so, it
forwards the second encryption to v (fourth message) and terminates the protocol by outputting a handle to
the shared secret key Kuv to its user. Finally v decrypts this message, obtains the shared key Kuv, and tests
1The strengthened protocol presented in [54] further contains an encryption of the nonce Nv with Kuv in the fourth term to
guarantee entity authentication of u to v. We omitted this encryption to concentrate on the key secrecy property of the core key
exchange functionality.
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Algorithm 1 Evaluation of User Inputs in MYau with u 6= T (Protocol Start)
Input: (new prot,Yahalom, v) at KE inu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: nhndu ← gen nonce().
2: Nonceu := Nonceu ∪ {(nhndu , v, 1)}.
3: uhnd ← store(u).
4: mhnd1 ← list(u
hnd, nhndu ).
5: send i(v,mhnd1 ).
if the message contains its own identity and the contained nonce was previously sent to T. If so, it outputs a
handle to the shared key Kuv to its user and terminates the protocol.
2.1 Protocol Details with the Dolev-Yao-style Cryptographic Library
Almost all formal proof techniques for protocols first need a reformulation of the protocol into a more
detailed version than the four steps above. These details include necessary tests on received messages, the
types and generation rules for values like u and Nu, and a surrounding framework specifying the number
of participants, the possibilities of multiple protocol runs, and the adversary capabilities. The same is true
when using the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library from [24], i.e., it plays a similar role in our proof as
“the CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the inductive-approach Dolev-Yao model” in other proofs. We now present
the protocol details in this framework, and explain general aspects of the framework in Section 2.2.
We write “:=” for deterministic assignment, and ↓ is an error element available as an addition to the
domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The framework is automata-based, i.e., protocols are
executed by interacting machines, and event-based, i.e., machines react on received inputs. By MYai we
denote the Yahalom machine for a participant i; it can act in the roles of both u and v above.
The first type of input that MYai can receive is a start message (new prot,Yahalom, v) from its user
denoting that it should start a protocol run with user v. The number of users is called n.2 User inputs
are distinguished from network inputs by arriving at a so-called port KE inu?. The “?” for input ports
follows the CSP convention, and “KE” stands for key exchange because the user interface is the same for
all key exchange protocols. The reaction on this input, i.e., the sending of the first message, is described
in Algorithm 1. The command gen nonce generates the nonce. MYau stores the resulting so-called handle
nhndu (a local name that this machine has for the corresponding term) in a set Nonceu for future comparison
together with the identity v and an indicator that this nonce was generated and stored by u in the first step.
The set Nonceu formally consists of triples (nhnd, w, j) where nhnd is a handle, w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}, and
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. A triple (nhnd, w, j) means that MYau stored the handle nhnd in the j-th protocol step in a
session with w. The command store inputs arbitrary application data into the cryptographic library, here
the user identity u. The command list forms a list, and the final command send i means that MYau sends the
resulting term to v over an insecure channel. The effect is that the adversary obtains a handle to the term
and can decide what to do with it (such as forwarding it to MYav or performing Dolev-Yao-style algebraic
operations on the term). The superscript hnd on most parameters denotes that these are handles, i.e., the users
obtain local names for the corresponding terms. This is an important aspect of [24] because it allows the
same protocol description to be implemented once with Dolev-Yao-style idealized cryptography and once
with real cryptography. The four commands we saw so far and their input and output domains belong to the
interface (in the same sense as, e.g., a Java interface) of the underlying cryptographic library. This interface
is implemented by both the idealized and the real version. In the first case, the handles are local names
2The set of users is {1, . . . , n} and the Yahalom protocol is designed such that T 6∈ {1, . . . , n} where T denotes the trusted
party.
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of Dolev-Yao-style terms, in the second case of real cryptographic bitstrings, on which the adversary can
perform arbitrary bit manipulations. We say more about these two implementations below.
We now define formally how protocol machines and the trusted party behave upon receiving an input
from the network. To increase readability we augment the algorithm with comments at its right-hand side
to depict which handle corresponds to which Dolev-Yao term. We further use the naming convention that
ingoing and outgoing messages are labeled m, where outgoing messages have an additional subscript cor-
responding to the protocol step. Ciphertexts are labeled c, the encrypted lists are labeled l, and terms whose
type is still unknown are labelled t or x, all with suitable sub- and superscripts.
Network inputs arrive at port outu? and are of the form (v, u, i,mhnd) where v is the supposed sender, i
denotes that the channel is insecure, and mhnd is a handle to a list. The port outu? is connected to the cryp-
tographic library, whose two implementations represent the obtained Dolev-Yao-style term or real bitstring,
respectively, to the protocol in a unified way by the handle mhnd.
The behavior of MYau for u ∈ {1, . . . , n} is given in Algorithm 2. Upon receiving a network input MYau
first decomposes the obtained message and checks if it could correspond to the first, third, or fourth step
of the protocol. (Recall that the second step is only performed by T.) This is implemented by querying
the type of the first component and by looking up the respective nonce in the set Nonceu. After that,
MYau checks if the obtained message is indeed a suitably constructed message for the particular step by
exploiting the content of Nonceu. If so, MYau constructs a message according to the protocol description,
sends it to the intended recipient, updates the set Nonceu, and possibly signals to its user that a key has been
successfully shared with another user. The behavior of MYaT upon receiving an input (v,T, i,mhnd) from the
cryptographic library at port outT? is defined similarly.
The formal definition of the behavior of the trusted party is given in Algorithm 3. We omit an information
description.
A machine should immediately abort the handling of the current input if a cryptographic command does
not yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption fails. This is captured by the following convention.
Convention 1 If MYau receives ↓ as the answer of the cryptographic library to a command, then MYau aborts
the execution of the current algorithm, except for the command types list proj or send i.
2.2 Overall Framework and Adversary Model
The framework that determines how machines such as our Yahalom machines and the machines of the ide-
alized or real cryptographic library execute is taken from [55]. The basis is an asynchronous probabilistic
execution model with distributed scheduling and with a well-defined Turing-machine refinement for com-
plexity considerations. We already used implicitly above that for term construction and parsing commands
to the cryptographic library, so-called local scheduling is defined, i.e., a result is returned immediately. The
idealized or real network sending via this library, however, is scheduled by the adversary.
When protocol machines such as MYau there is no guarantee that all these machines are correct. A trust
model determines for what subsets H of {1, . . . , n,T} we want to guarantee anything; here these are the
subsets that contain at least the trusted party: We prove secrecy of keys shared by u and v whenever u, v ∈ H
and thus whenever MYau and MYav are correct. Incorrect machines disappear and are replaced by the adversary.
Each set of potential correct machines together with its user interface is called a structure, and the set of
these structures is called the system. When considering the security of a structure, an arbitrary probabilistic
machine H is connected to the user interface to represent all users, and an arbitrary probabilistic machine
A is connected to the remaining free ports (typically the network) and to H to represent the adversary. In
polynomial-time security proofs, H and A are polynomial-time. This setting implies that any number of
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Algorithm 2 Evaluation of Network Inputs in MYau with u 6= T
Input: (v, u, i,mhnd) at outu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u} ∪ {T}.
1: thndi ← list proj(m
hnd, i) for i = 1, 2, 3.
2: typethnd
1
← get type(thnd1 ).
3: if type thnd
1
= data ∧ v 6= T ∧ ∀j : (thnd2 , v, j) 6∈ Nonceu then {First Message is input}
4: type thnd
2
← get type(thnd2 ).
5: t1 ← retrieve(thnd1 ).
6: if t1 6= v ∨ typethnd
2
6= nonce then Abort end if
7: nhndu ← gen nonce().
8: Nonceu := Nonceu ∪ {(nhndu , v, 2)}.
9: uhnd ← store(u).
10: lhnd2 ← list(t
hnd
1 , t
hnd
2 ). {l
hnd
2 ≈ (v,Nv)}
11: chnd2 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
u,T, l
hnd
2 ). {c
hnd
2 ≈ (v,Nv)Kut}
12: mhnd2 ← list(u
hnd, nhndu , c
hnd
2 ). {m
hnd
2 ≈ (u,Nu, (v,Nv)Kut)}
13: send i(T,mhnd2 ).
14: else if type thnd
1
= nonce ∧ v = T then {Third Message is input}
15: lhnd ← sym decrypt(sksehndu,T, t
hnd
2 ). {l
hnd ≈ (v,Kuv , Nu)}
16: xhndi ← list proj(l
hnd, i) for i = 1, 2, 3.
17: x1 ← retrieve(xhnd1 ).
18: typexhnd
2
← get type(xhnd2 ).
19: type thnd
3
← get type(thnd3 ).
20: if (xhnd3 , x1, 1) 6∈ Nonceu ∨ typexhnd
2
6= skse ∨ type thnd
3
6= symenc then Abort end if
21: Nonceu := (Nonceu \ {(xhnd3 , x1, 1)}) ∪ {(x
hnd
3 , x1, 3)}.
22: mhnd4 ← list(t
hnd
3 ). {m
hnd
4 ≈ (u, v,Kuv , Nv)Kvt}
23: Output (ok initiator,Yahalom, x1, xhnd2 ) at KE outu !.
24: send i(x1,mhnd4 ).
25: else if type thnd
1
= symenc ∧ v 6= T then {Fourth Message is input}
26: lhnd ← sym decrypt(sksehndu,T, t
hnd
1 ). {l
hnd ≈ (v, u,Kuv , Nu)}
27: xhndi ← list proj(l
hnd, i) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
28: xi ← retrieve(xhndi ) for i = 1, 2.
29: typexhnd
3
← get type(xhnd3 ).
30: if x1 6= v ∨ x2 6= u ∨ typexhnd
3
6= skse ∨ (xhnd4 , x1, 2) 6∈ Nonceu then Abort end if
31: Nonceu := (Nonceu \ {(xhnd4 , x1, 2)}) ∪ {(x
hnd
4 , x1, 4)}.
32: Output (ok responder,Yahalom, x1, xhnd3 ) at KE outu !.
33: else
34: Abort
35: end if
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Algorithm 3 Behavior of the Trusted Party MYaT
Input: (v,T, i,mhnd) at outT? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
1: thndi ← list proj(m
hnd, i) for i = 1, 2, 3.
2: t1 ← retrieve(thnd1 ). {t1 ≈ v}
3: typethnd
2
← get type(thnd2 ).
4: lhnd ← sym decrypt(sksehndT,v , t
hnd
3 ). {l
hnd ≈ (u,Nu)}
5: xhndi ← list proj(l
hnd, i) for i = 1, 2.
6: x1 ← retrieve(xhnd1 ). {x1 ≈ u}
7: typexhnd
2
← get type(xhnd2 ).
8: if type thnd
2
6= nonce ∨ typexhnd
2
6= nonce ∨ t1 6= v ∨ x1 6∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v} then Abort end if
9: sksehnd ← gen symenc key(). {sksehnd ≈ Kuv}
10: l(1)
hnd
3 ← list(t
hnd
1 , skse
hnd, xhnd2 ). {l
(1)hnd
3 ≈ (v,Kuv , Nu)}
11: c(1)
hnd
3 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
T,x1
, l
(1)hnd
3 ). {c
(1)hnd
3 ≈ (v,Kuv , Nu)Kut}
12: l(2)
hnd
3 ← list(x
hnd
1 , t
hnd
1 , skse
hnd, thnd2 ). {l
(2)hnd
3 ≈ (u, v,Kuv , Nv)}
13: c(2)
hnd
3 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
T,v , l
(2)hnd
3 ). {c
(2)hnd
3 ≈ (u, v,Kuv , Nv)Kvt}
14: mhnd3 ← list(t
hnd
2 , c
(1)hnd
3 , c
(2)hnd
3 ). {m
hnd
3 ≈ (Nv , (v,Kuv , Nu)Kut , (u, v,Kuv , Nv)Kvt)}
15: send i(x1,mhnd3 ).
concurrent protocol runs with the honest participants and the adversary are considered because H and A can
arbitrarily interleave protocol start inputs (new prot,Yahalom, v) with the delivery of network messages.
For a set H of honest participants, the user interface of the Yahalom protocol machines is SKEH :=
{KE inu?,KE outu ! | u ∈ H \ {T}}. The ideal and real Yahalom protocol serving this interface differ only
in the cryptographic library, i.e., the Yahalom machines either rely on a set Mˆ cryH := {M
cry
u,H | u ∈ H} of
real cryptographic machines or an ideal machine THcryH called trusted host. With Mˆ YaH := {MYau | u ∈ H},
the ideal system is SysYa,id := {(Mˆ YaH ∪ {TH
cry
H },S
KE
H ) | {T} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n,T}}, and the real system
is SysYa,realSE := {(Mˆ YaH ∪ Mˆ
cry
H ,S
KE
H ) | {T} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n,T}}, where SE denotes the symmetric
encryption scheme used.
On Polynomial Runtime. In order to be valid users of the real cryptographic library, the machines MYau
have to be polynomial-time. We therefore define that each machine MYau maintains explicit polynomial
bounds on the accepted message lengths and the number of inputs accepted at each port. As this is done
exactly as in the cryptographic library, we omit the rigorous write-up.
3 The Key Secrecy Property
In the following, we formalize the key secrecy property of the ideal and real Yahalom protocols. The
property is an instantiation of a general key secrecy definition for arbitrary protocols based on the ideal
cryptographic library. It was introduced in [20] and is symbolic, based on the typical notion that a term
is not an element of the adversary’s knowledge set. In the given Dolev-Yao-style library, the adversary’s
knowledge set is the set of all terms to which the adversary has a handle.
We start this section by defining the possible states of the ideal and real cryptographic library as needed
for formulating the property, and then define the property.
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3.1 Overview and States of the Ideal Cryptographic Library
The ideal cryptographic library administrates Dolev-Yao-style terms and allows each user to operate on them
via handles, i.e., via local names specific to this user. The handles also contain the information that knowl-
edge sets give in other Dolev-Yao formalizations: The set of terms that a participant u knows, including
u = a for the adversary, is the set of terms with a handle for u. The terms are typed; for instance, decryption
only succeeds on ciphertexts and projection only on lists. Moreover, the terms are globally numbered by
a so-called index. Each term is represented by its type (i.e., root node) and its first-level arguments, which
can be indices of earlier terms. This enables easy distinction of, e.g., which of many nonces is encrypted in
a larger term. These global indices are never visible at the user interface. The indices and the handles for
each participant are generated by one counter each.
The data structure storing the terms in [24] is a database D. Generally, a database D is a set of functions,
called entries, each over a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is
written x.att . For a predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose attributes
fulfill pred . If D[pred ] contains only one element, we use the same notation for this element. Adding an
entry x to D is abbreviated D :⇐ x. Moreover, we write the list operation as l := (x1, . . . , xj), and
argument retrieval as l[i] with l[i] = ↓ if i > j. In the specific term database D, each entry x can have
arguments (ind , type , arg , hndu1 , . . . , hndum, hnd a, len), for {u1, . . . , um} = H and the arguments have
the following types and meaning:
• x.ind is the global index of an entry. Its type INDS is isomorphic to N and distinguishes index
arguments from others. The index is used as a primary key attribute of the database, i.e., we write
D[i] for the selection D[ind = i].
• x.type ∈ typeset is the type of x. We use the types nonce, list, data (for payload data), skse and pkse
(for symmetric encryption keys and corresponding “public-key identifiers”, see below), and symenc
(for symmetric encryptions).
• x.arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Arguments of type INDS are indices
of other entries (subterms); we sometimes distinguish them by a superscript “ind”.
• x.hndu ∈ HNDS ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles, where x.hndu = ↓ means that u does not
know this entry and HNDS is another set isomorphic to N. We always use a superscript “hnd” for
handles.
• x.len ∈ N0 denotes the length of the entry.
The machine THH has a counter size ∈ INDS for the current size of D and counters curhndu (current
handle) for the handles, all initialized with 0.
In order to capture that keys shared between users and the trusted party have already been generated and
distributed, we assume that suitable entries for the keys already exist in the database. We denote the handle
of u to the secret key shared with v, where either u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v = T or vice versa, by sksehndu,v .
3.2 The Real Cryptographic Library
In the real implementation of the cryptographic library, each user has its own machine. This machine con-
tains a database Du with only three main attributes: the handle hndu for this user u, the real cryptographic
bitstring word , and the type type . The users can use exactly the same commands as with the ideal library,
e.g., en- or decrypt a message etc. These commands now trigger real cryptographic operations. The op-
erations essentially use standard cryptographically secure primitives, but with certain additional tagging,
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randomization etc. Send commands now trigger the actual sending of bitstrings between machines and/or to
the adversary.
3.3 Definition of the Key Secrecy Property
The first step towards defining symbolic key secrecy is to consider one state of the ideal Dolev-Yao-style
library and to define that a handle points to a symmetric key, that the key is symbolically unknown to the
adversary, and that it has not been used for encryption or authentication. These are the symbolic conditions
under which we can hope to prove that the corresponding real key is indistinguishable from a fresh random
key for the adversary. Note that the operations that the Yahalom protocol performs on new keys are allowed
in this sense. For Condition (3) in the definition, note that the arguments of a ciphertext term are (l, pk )
where l is the plaintext index and pk the index of the public tag of the secret key, with pk = sk − 1 for the
secret key index.
Definition 3.1 (Symbolically Secret Encryption Keys [20]) Let {T} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n,T}, a database state
D of THcryH , and a pair (u, lhnd) ∈ H × HNDS of a user and a handle be given. Let i := D[hndu =
lhnd].ind be the corresponding database index. The term under (u, lhnd) (1) is a symmetric encryption key
iff D[i].type = skse, (2) is symbolically unknown (to the adversary) iff D[i].hnd a = ↓, (3) has not been used
for encryption, or short is unused, iff for all indices j ∈ N we have D[j].type = symenc ⇒ D[j].arg [2] 6=
i− 1, and (4) is a symbolically secret key iff it has the three previous properties. ✸
A secret-key belief function is a general way to designate the keys whose secrecy should be proved. The
underlying theory from [20] is based on such functions. We instantiate them for the Yahalom protocol
and thus essentially for all individual key exchange protocols. A secret key belief function maps the user
view to a set of triples (u, lhnd, t) of a user, a handle, and a type, pointing to the supposedly secret keys.
For the Yahalom protocol, we define secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator Ya for the initiator and
seckeys responder Ya for the responder that designate the exchanged keys.
Definition 3.2 (Secret-key Belief Functions for the Yahalom Protocol) A secret-key belief function for a set
H is a function seckeys that maps each view view of the user to an element of (H×HNDS × {skse})∗.
The secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator Ya and seckeys responder Ya of the Yahalom protocol
map each element (ok initiator,Yahalom, v, sksehnd) respectively (ok responder,Yahalom, v, sksehnd) of
view arriving at port KE outu? in the users view to (u, sksehnd, skse) if u ∈ H, and to ǫ otherwise. Elements
of view that are not of this form are also mapped to ǫ. ✸
We now define symbolic key secrecy for such a function. In addition to the conditions for individual keys,
we require that all elements point to different terms, so that we can expect the corresponding list of crypto-
graphic keys to be entirely random.
Definition 3.3 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Generally and for the Yahalom Protocol) Let a user H∗ suitable for a
structure ({THcryH },S
cry
H ) of the cryptographic library Sys
cry,id and a secret-key belief function seckeys for
H be given. The ideal cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly symbolically
secret iff for all configurations conf = ({THcryH },S
cry
H ,H,A) of this structure, every v ∈ viewconf (H), and
every element (ui, lhndi , ti) of the set seckeys(v), the term under (ui, lhndi ) is a symbolically secret key of
type ti, and D[hndui = lhndi ].ind 6= D[hnduj = lhndj ].ind for all i 6= j.
The ideal Yahalom protocol keeps the exchanged keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret iff
the ideal cryptographic library keeps the keys in seckeys initiator Ya and seckeys responder Ya strictly
symbolically secret with all users H∗ that are the combination of the machines MYau for u ∈ H and a user H
of those machines. ✸
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General cryptographic key secrecy requires that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the keys
designated by the function seckeys from fresh keys. The cryptographic key secrecy of the Yahalom protocol
is the instantiation for seckeys initiator Ya and seckeys responder Ya and the configurations of the Yahalom
protocol.
Definition 3.4 (Cryptographic Key Secrecy Generally and for the Yahalom Protocol) Let a polynomial-time
configuration conf = (Mˆ cryH ,S
cry
H ,H,A) of the real cryptographic library Sys
cry,real
SE and a secret-key belief
function seckeys for H be given. Let genSE denote the key generation algorithm. This configuration keeps
the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret iff for all probabilistic-polynomial time algorithms Dis (the
distinguisher), we have
|Pr[Dis(1k, va, keysreal ) = 1]− Pr[Dis(1
k, va, keysfresh ) = 1]| ∈ NEGL
where NEGL denotes the negligible function of the security parameter k and the used random variables
are defined as follows: For r ∈ runconf , let va := viewconf (A)(r) be the view of the adversary, let
(ui, l
hnd
i , ti)i=1,...,n := seckeys(viewconf (H)(r)) be the user-handle-type triples of presumably secret keys,
and let the keys be keysreal := (ski )i=1,...,n with
ski := Dui [hndui = l
hnd
i ].word if Dui [hndui = lhndi ].type = ti, else ǫ;
and keysfresh := (sk ′i )i=1,...,n with sk ′i ← genA(1k) if ti = ska, else sk ′i ← ǫ.
A polynomial-time configuration (Mˆ cryH ∪Mˆ YaH ,SKEH ,H,A) of the real Yahalom protocol Sys
Ya,real keeps
the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret iff the configuration (Mˆ cryH ,S cryH , {H}∪Mˆ YaH ,A)
keeps the keys in seckeys initiator Ya and seckeys responder Ya cryptographically secret. ✸
The following theorem captures the security of the Yahalom protocol.
Theorem 3.1 (Security of the Yahalom Protocol) The ideal Yahalom system SysYa,id from Section 2.2 keeps
the exchanged keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret, and all polynomial-time configurations of
the real system SysYa,real keep the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret. ✷
4 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization from the Idealization
As discussed in the introduction, the idea of our approach is to prove Theorem 3.1 for the protocol using the
ideal Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library. Then the result for the real system follows automatically. The
notion that a system Sys1 securely implements another system Sys2 in the sense of reactive simulatability
(recall the introduction), is written Sys1 ≥polysec Sys2 (in the computational case). The main result of [24, 27,
18] is therefore
Syscry,real ≥polysec Sys
cry,id. (1)
If symmetric encryption is present, this result is additionally subject to the condition that the surrounding
protocol, in our case the Yahalom protocol, does not raise a so-called commitment problem for symmetric
encryption. It is a nice obseration that this condition can immediately concluded from the overall proof; we
give the formal argument in Appendix A. For technical reasons, one further has to ensure that the protocol
does not create encryption cycles (such as encrypting a key with itself); this is needed even for much weaker
properties than simulatability, see [3]. This property clearly holds for the Yahalom protocol.
Once we have shown that the considered keys are symbolically secret and that the commitment problem
does not occur for the Yahalom protocol, we can exploit the key-secrecy preservation theorem of [20]: If
for certain honest users H and a secret-key belief function seckeys the ideal cryptographic library keeps the
keys in seckeys strictly symbolically secret, then every configuration of H with the real cryptographic library
keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret.
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5 Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section finally contains the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 3.1: We prove that the Yahalom protocol
with the ideal, Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library keeps the exchanged keys of honest users strictly
symbolically secret. The proof idea is the following: If an honest user u successfully terminates a session
run with another honest user v, we first show that the established key has been created by the trusted party.
Then we exploit that the trusted party and the honest users only send this key within an encryption generated
with a key shared between u and T respectively v and T, and we conclude that the adversary never gets a
handle to the key. The main challenge is to find suitable invariants on the state of the ideal Yahalom system.
This is similar to formal proofs using other Dolev-Yao model, and the similarity supports our hope that the
new, sound cryptographic library can be used like other Dolev-Yao models in automated tools. We now
present the invariants of the system SysYa,id. Their proof is postponed to Appendix B.
The first invariants, correct nonce owner and unique nonce use, are easily proved. They essentially state
that handles nhnd where (nhnd, ·, ·) is contained in a set Nonceu point to entries of type nonce and that no
nonce is in two such sets.
Invariant 1 (Correct Nonce Owner) For all u ∈ H\{T}, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and (nhnd, v, j) ∈
Nonceu, we have D[hndu = nhnd] 6= ↓ and D[hndu = nhnd].type = nonce.
Invariant 2 (Unique Nonce Use) For all u, v ∈ H\{T}, all w,w′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, all j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
all i ≤ size: If (D[i].hndu , w, j) ∈ Nonceu and (D[i].hndv , w′, j′) ∈ Noncev, then (u,w) = (v,w′).
The invariant encrypted-key secrecy states that a key shared between honest u and v as well as all lists
containing this key can only be known to u, v, and T. Moreover, it states that such lists only occur within
symmetric encryptions created with the key shared between u and T respectively between v and T.
Invariant 3 (Encrypted-Key Secrecy) For all u, v ∈ H\{T} and all i ≤ size with D[i].type = symenc: Let
l ind := D[i].arg [1], pkse ind := D[i].arg [2], x indt := D[l
ind].arg [t], and xt := D[x indt ].arg [1] for t = 1, 2, 3.
If D[l ind].type = list ∧ pkse ind = pkseu ∧ x1 = v ∧D[x indt ].type = skse for some t ∈ {1, 2, 3} then
a) D[x indt ].hndw = ↓ and D[l′ind].hndw = ↓ for (H \ {u, v,T}) ∪ {a} and for all l′ind with x indt ∈
D[l′ind].arg .
b) For all l′, k ≤ size such that D[l′].type = list ∧ x indt ∈ D[l′].arg , we have that l′ ∈ D[k] only if
D[k].type = symenc and D[k].arg [2] ∈ {pkseu, pksev}.
The invariant correct encryption owner finally states that certain protocol messages can only be constructed
by the “intended” users or by the trusted party, respectively. We refer to Step i of Algorithm j as Step j.i.
Invariant 4 (Correct Encryption Owner) For all u ∈ H \ {T} and all i ≤ size with D[i].type = symenc:
Let l indk := D[i].arg [2k − 1] and pkse
ind
k := D[i].arg [2k] for 1 ≤ k ≤
|D[i].arg|
2 (entries of type
symenc have an even number of arguments by construction). Let further x indk,t := D[l indk ].arg [t] and
xhndk,t,u := D[x
ind
k,t ].hndu for t = 1, 2, 3, 4, and xk,t := D[x indk,t ].arg [1] for t = 1, 2.
a) If pkse indk = pkseu , xk,1 ∈ H, D[x indk,2 ].type = skse, and (xhndk,3,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu for some j ∈
{1, 3} and some k ∈ {1, . . . , |D[i].arg|2 }, then D[i] was created by M
Ya
T in Step 3.11.
b) If pkse indk = pkseu , xk,1 ∈ H, xk,2 = u, D[x indk,3 ].type = skse, and (xhndk,4,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu for
some j ∈ {2, 4} and some k ∈ {1, . . . , |D[i].arg|2 }, then D[i] was created by M
Ya
T in Step 3.13.
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5.1 Proof of the Key Secrecy Property
To increase readability, we partition the proof into several steps with explanations in between. Assume that
u, v ∈ H and that MYau outputs (ok initiator,Yahalom, v, sksehndu ) or (ok responder,Yahalom, v, sksehndu )
to its user. We first show that this implies that MYau has received a message corresponding to the third
or fourth protocol step so that the contained encryptions are of the form that allows us to apply correct
encryption owner to show that they were created by MYaT . After that we will exploit encrypted-key secrecy
to show that keys created by MYaT and to be shared amongst u and v will remain secret to the adversary. The
following property of THH proven in [24] will be useful in this proof to show that properties proven for one
time also hold at another time.
Lemma 5.1 The ideal cryptographic library Syscry,id has the following property: The only modifications
to existing entries x in D are assignments to previously undefined attributes x.hndu (except for counter
updates in entries for signature keys, which we do not have to consider here), and appending new elements
to the list of arguments of symmetric encryptions. ✷
Proof. (Ideal part of Theorem 3.1) Assume that MYau outputs (ok initiator,Yahalom, v, sksehndu ) or
(ok responder,Yahalom, v, sksehndu ) at KE outu ! for u, v ∈ H at time t3, and let skse ind := D[hndu =
sksehndu ].ind . By definition of Algorithms 1 and 2, this output can only happen in Step 2.23 respec-
tively 2.32, and only after there was an input (w, u, i,m3hndu ) respective (w, u, i,m4
hnd
u ) at a time t2 < t3.
Here and in the sequel we use the notation of Algorithm 1, 2, and 3 but we distinguish the variables from its
different executions by an additional superscript indicating the number of the (claimed) received protocol
message, here 3 and 4, and give handles an additional subscript for their owner, here u.
Case 1: Output in Step 2.23. Assume that MYau outputs (ok initiator,Yahalom, v, skse3
hnd
u ) at KE outu !
for u, v ∈ H in Step 2.23 at time t3. Hence the execution of Algorithm 2 for this input must have given
l3
hnd
u 6= ↓ in Step 2.15, since the algorithm would otherwise abort by Convention 1 without creating an output.
Let t32
ind
:= D[hndu = t
3hnd
2,u ].ind , l
3ind := D[hndu = l
3hnd
u ].ind and (l1, pkse1, l2, pkse2, . . . , lj , pksej) :=
D[t32
ind
].arg (which is the general argument format for symmetric encryption entries). The definition of
sym decrypt then implies D[l3ind].type = list and D[t32
ind
].type = symenc, and further that there exists
some unique k with 1 ≤ k ≤ j such that D[t32
ind
].arg [2k − 1] = l3
ind
, and
D[t32
ind
].arg [2k] = pkseu. (2)
Let x3i
ind
:= D[l3
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.16. By Step 2.17 and the definition of
retrieve we have
D[x31
ind
].arg [1] = x31 = v. (3)
By definition of list proj and get type, and since the condition of Step 2.20 is false, we finally have
x3
hnd
1,u = D[x
3
1
ind
].hndu at time t3, (4)
(x3
hnd
3,u , x
3
1, 3) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
3
2
ind
].type = skse at time t3, (5)
and
(x3
hnd
3,u , x
3
1, 1) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
3
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (6)
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Case 2: Output in Step 2.32. This case is similar to the first one: Assume that MYau outputs
(ok responder,Yahalom, v, skse4
hnd
u ) at KE outu ! for u, v ∈ H in Step 2.32 at time t3. The execution of Al-
gorithm 2 for this input must have given l4hndu 6= ↓ in Step 2.26, since the algorithm would otherwise abort by
Convention 1 without creating an output. Let t41
ind
:= D[hndu = t
4hnd
1,u ].ind , l
4ind := D[hndu = l
4hnd
u ].ind
and (l1, pkse1, l2, pkse2, . . . , lj , pksej) := D[t41
ind
].arg . The definition of sym decrypt then implies
D[l4
ind
].type = list and D[t41
ind
].type = symenc, and further that there exists a unique k with 1 ≤ k ≤ j
such that D[t41
ind
].arg [2k − 1] = l4
ind
, and
D[t41
ind
].arg [2k] = pkseu. (7)
Let x4i
ind
:= D[l4
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.27. By Step 2.28 and the definition of
retrieve we have x4i = D[x4i
ind
].arg [1] for i = 1, 2 and
D[x41
ind
].arg [1] = x41 = v. (8)
By definition of list proj and get type, and because of the conditions of Step 2.25 and 2.30, we have
x42 = u, (9)
x4
hnd
1,u = D[x
4
1
ind
].hndu at time t3, (10)
(x4
hnd
4,u , x
4
1, 4) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
4
3
ind
].type = skse at time t3, (11)
and
(x4
hnd
4,u , x
4
1, 2) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
4
3
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (12)
This first part of the proof shows that MYau has received an encryption of a specific form as part of a third or
fourth protocol message. Now we apply correct encryption owner to the encryption entry D[t32
ind
] for the
first case respectively to D[l41
ind
] for the second case to show that this entry was created by MYaT .
Proof. (cont’d) Equations (2), (4) and (5) respectively (7), (10) and (11) are the preconditions for Part a)
respectively Part b) of correct encryption owner. Hence the entry D[t32ind] was created by MYaT in Step 3.11
respectively the entry D[t41
ind
] was created by MYaT in Step 3.13.
In both cases, the algorithm execution must have started with an input (w′,T, i,m2hndT ) at outT? at a time
t1 < t2 with w′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We conclude l2
hnd
T 6= ↓ in Step 3.4 because of Convention 1 and set l2
ind
:=
D[hndT = l
2hnd
T ].ind . The definition of sym decrypt implies D[l2
ind
].type = list, D[t23
ind
].type = symenc,
l2
ind
= D[t23
ind
].arg [2k′ − 1] and pksew′ = D[t23
ind
].arg [2k′] for some unique k′ ∈ {1, . . . , |D[t23
ind
].arg |,
cf. the first part of the proof. Let x2i
ind
:= D[l2
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2 at the time of Step 3.5.
As the condition of Step 3.8 is false immediately afterwards, we obtain x2hndi,T 6= ↓ for i = 1, 2. The
definitions of list proj and get type together with Lemma 5.1 imply
x2
hnd
i,T = D[x
2
i
ind
].hndT for i = 1, 2 at time t3. (13)
Step 3.8 further ensures t21 = w′ and x21 ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {w′}. By definition gen symenc key we obtain
skse2
hnd
6= ↓ and
D[skse2
ind
].type = skse (14)
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in Step 3.9 for skse2ind := D[hndT = skse2
hnd
].ind . Now we exploit that MYaT creates the entry D[t32
ind
]
in Step 3.11 with the input sym encrypt(skse2hndT,x1 , l
(1),2hnd
3,T ) respectively the entry D[t
4
1
ind
] in Step 3.13 with
the input sym encrypt(skse2hndT,w′ , l
(2),2hnd
3,T ). In particular, this implies k = 1 in Equtations (2) and (7) by the
definition of sym encrypt. Let l(i),23
ind
:= D[hndT = l
(1),2hnd
3,T ].ind for i = 1, 2. With the definitions of list
and list proj this implies l(1),23
ind
= l3
ind
respectively l(2),23
ind
= l4
ind
. Together with Equations (3), (8), (9)
and (13), this implies
skseind = x32
ind
= x22
ind
= skse2
ind
∧ x22
ind
= x33
ind
∧ t21 = x
3
1 = v ∧ x
2
1 = u, (15)
where x21 = u follows from pksex2
1
= D[l
(1),2
3
ind
].arg [2] = D[l3
ind
].arg [2] = pkseu, respectively
skseind = x42
ind
= x22
ind
= skse2
ind
∧ x21
ind
= x42
ind
∧ t21 = x
4
2 = u ∧ x
2
1 = x
4
1 = v, (16)
where t21 := D[t21
ind
].arg [1]. Thus Equations (3), (4) and (6) imply
(x2
hnd
2,u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
2
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2 (17)
respectively Equations (8), (10) and (12) imply
(x2
hnd
1,u , v, 2) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
2
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (18)
After this second part of the proof, we will finally derive that the terms selected by seckeys initiator Ya
and seckeys responder Ya are symbolically unused symmetric keys that have furthermore not been used for
encryption yet.
Proof. (cont’d) Note that the entries D[t32ind] and D[t41ind] fulfill the requirements of encrypted-key se-
crecy with respect to key entry D[skse2ind], which implies D[skse2ind].hnd a = ↓. Because of skse2
ind
=
skseind we have D[skseind].hnd a = D[skse2
ind
].hnd a = ↓, i.e., the term under (u, sksehndu ) is symbol-
ically unknown. Moreover skse2ind = skseind together with Equation (14) imply D[skseind].type =
D[skse2
ind
].type = skse, i.e., the term under (u, sksehndu ) is a symmetric key.
It remains to show that the key is unused at time t3. The only way to create an entry D[j] with
D[j].type = symenc and D[j].arg [2] = skseind − 1 is by inputting a command encrypt at port inw?
such that D[skseind].hndw 6= ↓. Since we have shown that D[skseind].hndw 6= ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v,T},
hence we only have to show that neither of them enters such a command until time t3. By inspection of Al-
gorithm 3, this clearly holds for T, since this may only happen in Steps 3.11 or 3.13. In both cases, the key
used is one of those that were iniatially distributed, i.e., D[j].arg [2] = sksew − 1 for some w ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since we have shown that each key selected by seckeys initiator Ya or seckeys responder Ya is newly gen-
erated by MYaT , we in particular have sksew 6= skse
ind
. Similar reasoning can be applied to Algorithm 1
and 2 of MYau to show that the only used keys are the ones shared between u and T respectively between v
and T.
References
[1] M. Abadi and A. D. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus. In Proc. 4th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 36–47, 1997.
14
[2] M. Abadi and J. Ju¨rjens. Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation. In Proc. 4th International
Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software (TACS), pages 82–94, 2001.
[3] M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography: The computational soundness of formal
encryption. In Proc. 1st IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science, volume 1872 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 3–22. Springer, 2000.
[4] M. Backes. Quantifying probabilistic information flow in computational reactive systems. In Proceedings of
10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), volume 3679 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 336–354. Springer, 2005.
[5] M. Backes. Real-or-random key secrecy of the Otway-Rees protocol via a symbolic security proof. Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS), 155:111–145, 2006.
[6] M. Backes, I. Cervesato, A. D. Jaggard, A. Scedrov, and J.-K. Tsay. Cryptographically sound security proofs
for basic and public-key kerberos. In Proceedings of 11th European Symposium on Research in Computer Se-
curity(ESORICS), volume 4189 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 362–383. Springer, 2006. Preprint
on IACR ePrint 2006/219.
[7] M. Backes and M. Duermuth. A cryptographically sound Dolev-Yao style security proof of an electronic pay-
ment system. In Proceedings of 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 78–93,
2005.
[8] M. Backes, M. Duermuth, D. Hofheinz, and R. Kuesters. Conditional reactive simulatability. In Proceedings
of 11th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), volume 4189 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 424–443. Springer, 2006. Preprint on IACR ePrint 2006/132.
[9] M. Backes, M. Du¨rmuth, and R. Ku¨sters. On simulatability soundness and mapping soundness of symbolic
cryptography. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2007:233, 2007.
[10] M. Backes and T. Gross. Tailoring the Dolev-Yao abstraction to web services realities. In Proceedings of 2005
ACM Secure Web Services Workshop (SWS), pages 65–74, 2005.
[11] M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In
Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 675–686. Springer, 2003.
[12] M. Backes, C. Jacobi, and B. Pfitzmann. Deriving cryptographically sound implementations using composition
and formally verified bisimulation. In Proceedings of 11th International Symposium on Formal Methods Europe
(FME), volume 2391 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 310–329. Springer, 2002.
[13] M. Backes and P. Laud. Computationally sound secrecy proofs by mechanized flow analysis. In Proceedings of
13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 370–379, 2006.
[14] M. Backes, S. Moedersheim, B. Pfitzmann, and L. Vigano. Symbolic and cryptographic analysis of the se-
cure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario. In Proceedings of Foundations of Software Science and Computational
Structures (FOSSACS), volume 3921 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 428–445. Springer, 2006.
[15] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Intransitive non-interference for cryptographic purposes. In Proceedings of 24th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 140–152, 2003.
[16] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Computational probabilistic non-interference. International Journal of Information
Security (IJIS), 3(1):42–60, 2004.
[17] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-
key protocol. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas of Computing (JSAC), 22(10):2075–2086, 2004.
[18] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Symmetric encryption in a simulatable Dolev-Yao style cryptographic library. In
Proceedings of 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 204–218, 2004.
[19] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Limits of the cryptographic realization of Dolev-Yao-style XOR. In Proceedings
of 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), volume 3679 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 178–196. Springer, 2005.
[20] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Relating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy. In Proc. 26th IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy, pages 171–182, 2005. Extended version in IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2004/300.
[21] M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. On the cryptographic key secrecy of the strengthened Yahalom protocol. In
Proceedings of 21st IFIP International Information Security Conference (SEC), pages 233–245, 2006.
[22] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and A. Scedrov. Key-dependent message security under active attacks - BRSIM/UC-
soundness of symbolic encryption with key cycles. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2005:421, 2005.
[23] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, M. Steiner, and M. Waidner. Polynomial liveness. Journal of Computer Security,
12(3-4):589–617, 2004.
15
[24] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. A composable cryptographic library with nested operations. In Proc.
10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 220–230, 2003.
[25] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Security in business process engineering. In Proceedings of 2003
International Conference on Business Process Management, volume 2678 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 168–183. Springer, 2003.
[26] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Low-level ideal signatures and general integrity idealization. In
Proceedings of 7th Information Security Conference (ISC), volume 3225 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 39–51. Springer, 2004.
[27] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Symmetric authentication within a simulatable cryptographic library.
International Journal of Information Security (IJIS), 4(3):135–154, 2005.
[28] M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Limits of the reactive simulatability/UC of Dolev-Yao models with
hashes. In Proceedings of 11th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security(ESORICS), volume
4189 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 404–423. Springer, 2006.
[29] D. Basin, S. Mo¨dersheim, and L. Vigano`. OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols. Interna-
tional Journal of Information Security, 2004.
[30] M. Bellare and C. Namprempre. Authenticated encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic
composition paradigm. In Advances in Cryptology: ASIACRYPT 2000, volume 1976 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 531–545. Springer, 2000.
[31] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Encode-then-encipher encryption: How to exploit nonces or redundancy in plain-
texts for efficient constructions. In Advances in Cryptology: ASIACRYPT 2000, volume 1976 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 317–330. Springer, 2000.
[32] C. Bodei, M. Buchholtz, P. Degano, F. Nielson, and H. Nielson. Automatic validation of protocol narration. In
Proc. 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 126–140, 2003.
[33] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. A logic for authentication. Technical Report 39, SRC DIGITAL,
1990.
[34] R. Canetti and J. Herzog. Universally composable symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols (the case of
encryption-based mutual authentication and key exchange). Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/334, 2004.
http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[35] D. Dolev and A. C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
29(2):198–208, 1983.
[36] S. Even and O. Goldreich. On the security of multi-party ping-pong protocols. In Proc. 24th IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 34–39, 1983.
[37] J. Guttman. Key compromise and the authentication tests. In Proc. Mathematical Foundations of Programming
Semantics, volume 17 of ENTCS, pages 1–21, 2001.
[38] J. Herzog. Computational Soundness of Formal Adversaries. PhD thesis, MIT, 2002.
[39] J. Herzog, M. Liskov, and S. Micali. Plaintext awareness via key registration. In Advances in Cryptology:
CRYPTO 2003, volume 2729 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 548–564. Springer, 2003.
[40] R. Impagliazzo and B. M. Kapron. Logics for reasoning about cryptographic constructions. In Proc. 44th IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 372–381, 2003.
[41] R. Kemmerer, C. Meadows, and J. Millen. Three systems for cryptographic protocol analysis. Journal of
Cryptology, 7(2):79–130, 1994.
[42] P. Laud. Semantics and program analysis of computationally secure information flow. In Proc. 10th European
Symposium on Programming (ESOP), pages 77–91, 2001.
[43] P. Laud. Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In Proc. 25th
IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 71–85, 2004.
[44] P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis.
In Proc. 5th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 112–121, 1998.
[45] G. Lowe. An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. Information Processing
Letters, 56(3):131–135, 1995.
[46] G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In Proc. 2nd Interna-
tional Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS), volume 1055
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 147–166. Springer, 1996.
[47] C. Meadows. Using narrowing in the analysis of key management protocols. In Proc. 10th IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy, pages 138–147, 1989.
16
[48] M. Merritt. Cryptographic Protocols. PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1983.
[49] D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries. In Proc.
1st Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), volume 2951 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
133–151. Springer, 2004.
[50] J. K. Millen. The interrogator: A tool for cryptographic protocol security. In Proc. 5th IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy, pages 134–141, 1984.
[51] J. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. A linguistic characterization of bounded oracle computation and
probabilistic polynomial time. In Proc. 39th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS),
pages 725–733, 1998.
[52] J. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, and V. Teague. A probabilistic polynominal-time process calculus for
analysis of cryptographic protocols (preliminary report). Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science,
47:1–31, 2001.
[53] L. Paulson. The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Cryptology, 6(1):85–128,
1998.
[54] L. Paulson. Relations between secrets: Two formal analyses of the yahalom protocol. Journal of Computer
Security, 9(3):197–216, 2001.
[55] B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its application to secure message
transmission. In Proc. 22nd IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 184–200, 2001. Extended version
of the model (with Michael Backes) IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2004/082, http://eprint.iacr.
org/.
[56] P. Rogaway, M. Bellare, J. Black, and T. Krovetz. OCB: A block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authen-
ticated encryption. In Proc. 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 196–205,
2001.
[57] A. W. Roscoe. Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR. In Proc. 8th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 98–107, 1995.
[58] S. Schneider. Security properties and CSP. In Proc. 17th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages
174–187, 1996.
[59] C. Sprenger, M. Backes, D. Basin, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Cryptographically sound theorem proving.
In Proceedings of 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 153–166, 2006.
A Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Yahalom Protocol
As the name suggests, a “commitment problem” in simulatability proofs captures a situation where the sim-
ulator commits itself to a certain message and later has to change this commitment to allow for a correct
simulation. In the case of symmetric encryption, the commitment problem occurs if the simulator learns
in some abstract way that a ciphertext was sent and hence has to construct an indistinguishable ciphertext,
knowing neither the secret key nor the plaintext used for the corresponding ciphertext in the real world. To
simulate the missing key, the simulator will create a new secret key, or rely on an arbitrary, fixed key if the
encryption systems guarantees indistinguishable keys, see [3]. Instead of the unknown plaintext, the simula-
tor will encrypt an arbitrary message of the correct length, relying on the indistinguishability of ciphertexts
of different messages. So far, the simulation is fine. It even stays fine if the message becomes known later
because secure encryption still guarantees that it is indistinguishable that the simulator’s ciphertext contains
a wrong message. However, if the secret key becomes known later, the simulator runs into trouble, because,
learning abstractly about this fact, it has to produce a suitable key that decrypts its ciphertext into the correct
message. It cannot cheat with the message because it has to produce the correct behavior towards the honest
users. This is typically not possible.
The solution for this problem taken in [18] for the cryptographic library is to leave it to the surrounding
protocol to guarantee that the commitment problem does not occur, i.e., the surrounding protocol must
guarantee that keys are no longer sent in a form that might make them known to the adversary once an
honest participant has started using them. To exploit the simulatability results of [18], we hence have to
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prove this condition for the Yahalom protocol. Formally, we have to show that the following property
NoComm does not occur: “If there exists an input from an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption
to be generated such that the corresponding key is not known to the adversary, then future inputs may only
cause this key to be sent within an encryption that cannot be decrypted by the adversary”. This event can
be rigorously defined using temporal logics but we omit the rigorous definition due to space constraints and
refer to [18]. The event NoComm is equivalent to the event “if there exists an input from an honest user
that causes a symmetric encryption to be generated such that the corresponding key is not known to the
adversary, the adversary never gets a handle to this key” but NoComm has the advantage that it can easily
be inferred from the abstract protocol description without presupposing knowledge about handles of the
cryptographic library. For the Yahalom protocol the event NoComm can easily be verified by inspection of
the abstract protocol description, and a detailed proof based on Algorithms 1-3 can also easily be performed
by exploiting the invariants we will present in Section 5.
Technically, the event NoComm is an integrity property, and the notion that SysYa,id perfectly fulfills
NoComm, written SysYa,id |=perf NoComm means that the property holds with probability one (over the
probability spaces of runs, a well-defined notion from the underlying model [55]) for all honest users and
for all adversaries.
Lemma A.1 (Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Yahalom Protocol) The ideal Yahalom system
SysYa,id perfectly fulfills the property NoComm, i.e., SysYa,id |=perf NoComm. ✷
Proof. Note first that the secret key shared initially between a user and the trusted party will never be sent
by definition in case the user is honest, and it is already known to the adversary when it is first used in case
of a dishonest user. The interesting cases are thus the keys generated by the trusted party in the protocol
sessions.
Let i ≤ size , D[i].type = skse such that D[i] was created by MYaT in Step 3.9, where, with the notation
of Algorithm 3, we have x1 = u and t1 = v for x1, t1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If u or v were dishonest, then the
adversary would get a handle for D[i] after MYaT finishes its execution, i.e., in particular before D[i] has
been used for encryption for the first time, since the adversary knows the keys shared between the dishonest
users and the trusted party. If both u and v are honest, encrypted-key secrecy applied to the entry D[c(1)3
ind
]
created in Step 3.11 in the same execution of MYaT then immediately implies D[i].hnd a = ↓ for all time t,
which finishes the proof.
B Proof of the Invariants
In the following we prove correct nonce owner, unique nonce use, correct encryption owner, and encrypted-
key secrecy by induction. Hence assume that all invariants hold at a particular time t in a run of the system,
and we have to show that they still hold at time t+ 1.
We start with the proof of correct nonce owner.
Proof. (Correct nonce owner) Let (nhnd, v, j) ∈ Nonceu for u ∈ H \ {T}, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}. By construction, this entry has been added to Nonceu by MYau in Step 1.2, Step 2.8, Step 1.21,
or Step 1.31. In the last two cases, the entry (nhnd, v, j−2) was already contained in Nonceu at time t, hence
the claim follows by induction hypothesis of correct nonce owner. Thus consider the first two cases. In both
cases xhnd has been generated by the command gen nonce() at some time t, input at port inu? of THcryH .
Convention 1 implies nhnd 6= ↓, as MYau would abort otherwise and not add the entry to the set Nonceu. The
definition of gen nonce then implies D[hndu = nhnd] 6= ↓ and D[hndu = xhnd].type = nonce at time t.
Because of Lemma 5.1 this also holds at all later times t′ > t, which finishes the proof.
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The following proof of unique nonce use is quite similar.
Proof. (Unique Nonce Use) Assume for contradiction that both x1 := (D[i].hndu , w, j) ∈ Nonceu and
x2 := (D[i].hndv , w
′, j′) ∈ Noncev at some time t. Without loss of generality, let t + 1 be the first
such time and let x2 6∈ Noncev at time t. By construction, x2 is thus added to Noncev at time t + 1 by
Step 1.2, Step 2.8, Step 1.21, or Step 1.31. In the last two cases, the entry (xhnd, w′, j − 2) was already
contained in Nonceu (for the same handle xhnd and the same identity w′) and the claim follows by induction
hypothesis for unique nonce use again. In the first two cases, D[i].hndv has been generated by the command
gen nonce() at time t. The definition of gen nonce implies that D[i] is a new entry and D[i].hndv its only
handle at time t, and thus also at time t + 1. With correct nonce owner this implies u = v. Further,
x2 = (D[i].hndv , w
′, j′) is the only entry that is put into Noncev at times t and t + 1. Thus also w = w′.
This is a contradiction.
Proof. (Correct encryption owner) Let u ∈ H \ {T}, i ≤ size with D[i].type = symenc. Let l indk :=
D[i].arg [2k − 1] and pkse indk := D[i].arg [2k] for k ∈ {1, . . . ,
|D[i].arg|
2 }. Let further x
ind
k,q := D[l
ind
k ].arg [q]
and xhndk,q,u := D[x indk,q ].hndu for q = 1, 2, 3, 4, and xk,1 := D[x indk,1 ].arg [1]. Assume that for some k we
have pkse indk = pkseu, and assume further that (xhndk,3,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu for some j ∈ {1, 3} or that
(xhndk,4,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu for some j ∈ {2, 4}.
The only possibilities to violate the invariant correct encryption owner are that (1) the entry D[i] is
created at time t+1 or that (2) the handle D[i].hndu or D[x indk,q ].hndu for q = 3 in part a) or q = 4 in part b)
is created at time t+1 for an entry D[i] that already exists at time t or that (3) the handle (xhndk,q,u, xk,1, j) for
q ∈ {3, 4} is added to Nonceu at time t+1 such that (xhndk,q,u, x1, j−2) was not contained in Nonceu at time
t (i.e., we have to consider j ∈ {1, 2}). In all other cases the invariant holds by the induction hypothesis for
correct encryption owner and Lemma 5.1.
We start with the third case. Assume that (xhndk,q,u, xk,1, j) for q ∈ {3, 4} and j ∈ {1, 2} is added to
Nonceu at time t + 1. By construction, this only happens in a transition of MYau in Step 1.2 and Step 2.8.
However, here the entry D[x indk,q ] has been generated by the command gen nonce input at inu? at time t,
hence x indk,q cannot be contained as an argument of an entry D[l indk ] at time t. Formally, this corresponds to
the fact that D is well-formed, i.e., index arguments of an entry are always smaller than the index of the
entry itself; this has been shown in [24]. Since a transition of MYau does not modify entries in THcryH , this
also holds at time t+ 1.
For proving the remaining two cases, assume that D[i].hndu or D[x indk,q ].hndu is created at time t+1 for
an already existing entry D[i] or D[l indk ] or that D[i] is generated at time t+1. Because both can only happen
in a transition of THcryH , this implies (xhndk,q,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu already at time t, since transitions of TH
cry
H
cannot modify the set Nonceu. Now correct nonce owner implies xhndk,q,u = D[x indk,q ].hndu 6= ↓ already at
time t and thus also at time t+1 by Lemma 5.1. Symmetric encryptions can only be generated by the basic
command sym encrypt, which requires handles to all its elements. More precisely, if w ∈ H ∪ {a} creates
an entry D[i′] with D[i′].type = symenc and (x′1, . . . , x′m) := D[i].arg at time t+ 1 then D[x′i].hndw 6= ↓
for i = 1, . . . ,m already at time t. In particular, we have that D[x′2k].ind = D[pkse
ind
k ].ind = pkseu. The
definition of sym encrypt then implies D[skseu].hndw 6= ↓ and hence D[i] must have been created by either
u or T.
We finally have to show that the entry D[i] has been created by T in the claimed steps. This can easily
be seen by inspection of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. We only show it in detail for the first part of the invariant;
it can be proven similarly for second part. Let (xhndk,3,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu and D[x indk,2 ].type = skse. By
inspection of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 and because D[i].type = symenc, we see that the entry D[i] must have
been created by either MYau in Step 2.11 or by MYaT in Step 3.11 or 3.13. The list encrypted in Step 2.11 only
has two elements, which implies x indk,3 = ↓ and hence xhndk,3,u = ↓, and by correct nonce owner this gives a
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contradiction to (xhndk,3,u, xk,1, j) ∈ Nonceu. Similarly, if the entry D[i] were created in Step 3.13 then we
had D[x indk,2 ].type = data as the algorithm would have aborted otherwise in Step 3.2 by the definition of
retrieve and Convention 1.
Finally, we prove encrypted-key secrecy.
Proof. (Encrypted-key secrecy) Let u, v ∈ H, i ≤ size with D[i].type = symenc. Let l ind := D[i].arg [1],
pkse ind := D[i].arg [2], x indj := D[l
ind].arg [j], and xj := D[x indt ].arg [1] for t = 1, 2, 3. Assume
D[l ind].type = list, pkse ind = pkseu, x1 = v, and D[x indj ].type = skse for some j.
Part a) of the invariant can only be affected if a handle for w is added to an entry D[l′ind] or D[x indj ] that
already exist at time t. (Creation of D[l′ind] at time t with a handle for w is impossible as above because that
presupposes handles to all arguments of D[l′ind], i.e., in particular to D[x indj ], which contradicts encrypted-
key secrecy at time t; creation of D[x ind2 ] at time t with a handle for w would yield a contraction to x ind2
being an argument of lind at time t + 1 since D is well-formed, cf. the proof of correct encryption owner.
Thus we only have to consider those commands that add handles for w to entries of type list and skse
that already existed at time t. The only commands that add handles for w to D[l ind], i.e., a list entry,
are list proj, decrypt, adv parse, send i, and adv send i applied to an entry D[k] with l′ind ∈ D[k].arg .
Encrypted-Key secrecy for the entry D[l′] at time t then yields D[k].type = symenc. Thus the commands
list proj, send i, and adv send i do not have to be considered any further. Moreover, encrypted-key secrecy
also yields D[k].arg [2] ∈ {pkseu, pksev}. The keys shared between u and T respectively between v and
T are not known to w 6∈ {u, v,T}, formally D[skseu].hndw = D[sksev].hndw = ↓; Hence the command
sym decrypt input at inw? does not violate the invariant. Finally, the command adv parse applied to an entry
of type symenc with unknown secret key also does not give a handle to the cleartext list, i.e., to D[k].arg [1],
but only outputs its length and the key identifier.
The only commands that add handles for w to D[x indj ], i.e., a symmetric key entry, are list proj or
adv parse input at inw?, where adv parse has to be applied to an entry of type list, since only entries of
type list can have arguments which are indices to symmetric key entries. More precisely, if one of the
commands violated the invariant there would exist an entry D[i′] at time t such that D[l′ind].type = list,
D[l′ind].hndw 6= ↓ and x indj ∈ D[l′
ind].arg . Encrypted-key secrecy for the entry D[l′ind] at time t implies
D[l′ind].hndw = ↓, which yields a contradiction.
Part c) of the invariant can only be violated if a new entry D[k] is created at time t+1 with l′ ∈ D[k].arg
such that x indj ∈ D[l′].arg (by Lemma 5.1 and well-formedness). AsD[l′] already exists at time t, encrypted-
key secrecy for D[l′] implies D[l′].hndw = ↓ for w 6∈ {u, v,T} at time t. We can easily see by inspection of
the commands that the new entry D[k] must have been created by one of the commands list and sym encrypt
(or by encrypt or sign, which create an asymmetric encryption or a signature, respectively), since entries
newly created by other commands cannot have arguments that are indices of entries of type list. Since all
these commands entered at a port inz? presuppose D[j].hndz 6= ↓, the entry D[k] is created byw ∈ {u, v,T}
at time t+ 1. However, the only steps that can create an entry D[k] with l′ ∈ D[k].arg (with the properties
demanded for the entry D[l′]) are Steps 3.11 and 3.13. In all these cases, we have D[k].type = symenc.
Further, we have D[k].arg [2] = pksew′ where w′ denotes w’s current believed partner. We have to show
that w′ ∈ {u, v}. Let t ind1 := D[hndT = l
(1)hnd
3 ].arg [1] and t1 := D[t ind1 ].arg [1] at the time of Step 3.10.
Since the entry D[x indt ] is created immediately before in Step 3.9, we have that the entry D[k] has been
created in Step 3.11 is the first database entry with the properties demanded for D[k]. If i = k, then we have
w′ = u by construction and we are done. If i 6= k then nothing has to be shown since no entry D[i] exists
yet for which we have to show something.
If D[k] has been created in Step 3.13 we only have to show something if D[i] has been created be-
fore in Step 3.11. In this case Step 3.2 and the check in Step 3.8, imply w′ = t1 = D[t ind1 ].arg [1] =
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D[x ind1 ].arg [1] = x1 = v by definition of D[i].
Hence in both cases we obtained w′ ∈ {u, v}, i.e., the list containing the symmetric key was indeed
encrypted with the key of either u or v.
21
